India’s quest to modernize its air force capabilities has been a complex journey, marked by shifting priorities, geopolitical considerations, and evolving defense strategies. One of the most significant endeavors in this direction has been the Medium Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) program, previously referred to as the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) deal. This initiative aimed to bolster the Indian Air Force (IAF) with state-of-the-art fighter jets to replace its aging fleet.
The Contenders
The MRFA program attracted some of the world’s leading aerospace manufacturers, each vying for one of the most lucrative defense contracts of the decade. The initial contenders included:
- Dassault Rafale (France)
- Eurofighter Typhoon (European consortium)
- Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet (USA)
- Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon (USA) (later rebranded as the F-21 for India)
- Saab Gripen (Sweden)
- Mikoyan MiG-35 (Russia)
After extensive evaluations that considered performance, cost, maintenance, and transfer of technology (ToT), the Dassault Rafale emerged as the winner in 2012. The French jet was chosen for its superior capabilities, including advanced avionics, proven combat performance, and the ability to integrate seamlessly into the IAF’s operational framework.
Why the Initial Deal Didn’t Materialize
Despite Dassault Rafale’s selection, the deal to procure 126 aircraft—18 in flyaway condition and the remaining 108 to be manufactured in India by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) under a ToT agreement—ran into numerous obstacles. Key reasons included:
- Cost Escalation: The final price of the deal significantly exceeded initial estimates, raising concerns over affordability.
- Disputes Over Responsibility: Dassault and HAL faced disagreements regarding production quality assurances and timelines.
- Technology Transfer: Negotiations over the extent of technology transfer and the associated costs became a sticking point.
- Bureaucratic Delays: Complex decision-making processes and changes in government priorities contributed to prolonged delays.
The Shift to a Direct Procurement of 36 Rafales
By 2015, it became evident that the original MMRCA deal was unlikely to progress in its intended form. Amid rising geopolitical tensions and an urgent need to modernize the IAF’s capabilities, the Indian government opted for a direct procurement of 36 Rafale jets in flyaway condition under an inter-governmental agreement with France.
This decision was driven by several factors:
- Operational Urgency: The IAF’s depleting squadron strength necessitated immediate action to address operational gaps.
- Streamlined Procurement: A direct purchase avoided the complexities and delays associated with the original tender process.
- Enhanced Capabilities: The 36 Rafales came equipped with India-specific enhancements, including advanced radar systems, electronic warfare capabilities, and Meteor air-to-air missiles, ensuring they met the IAF’s specific requirements.
Finally, 36 aircraft were procured at the cost of approximately ₹59,000 crore. Of these, 28 are single-seater jets costing around ₹810 crore each, totaling ₹22,680 crore. The remaining 8 are twin-seater jets, used primarily as trainers, costing around ₹840 crore each, amounting to ₹6,720 crore. The remaining cost covered missile systems, training facilities, India-specific enhancements, infrastructure upgrades, and logistics support, ensuring the aircraft’s operational readiness and adaptability to Indian conditions.
Future Considerations
If India decides to proceed with procuring additional Rafales under the MRFA deal, it is estimated that negotiations and production could take 6-7 years. This timeline accounts for India’s insistence on ToT and the local manufacturing of the aircraft. Dassault Aviation, the manufacturer of Rafale, already has a backlog of approximately 200 aircraft, which would likely extend deliveries to around 2032, even if production is ramped up and supply chain issues are resolved.
Meanwhile, the indigenous Tejas Mk2 program is progressing steadily. Its first flight is expected in late 2026 or early 2027, with a significant number of aircraft built for testing to ensure the program is completed by 2029-2030. Full-scale production of the Tejas Mk2 is anticipated to begin around 2030. Given that the Tejas Mk2 is designed to match the Rafale’s capabilities, India might opt to focus on this homegrown platform instead.
Moreover, the Rafale is approaching obsolescence, necessitating upgrades. Dassault plans to introduce the F5 variant, which will feature enhancements such as compatibility with loyal wingman programs. These upgrades will be implemented first for the French Air Force starting in 2028 and subsequently for export customers, including India. The F5 variant’s costs are expected to escalate significantly, especially with India-specific modifications and enhancements. Additionally, integrating an Indian loyal wingman system into the Rafale would require further negotiations and development time.
In contrast, the Tejas Mk2 offers unrestricted flexibility for upgrades and integrations, as it is a domestic platform. This allows India to tailor the aircraft to its specific requirements without dependence on external suppliers, providing a strategic advantage in terms of cost, customization, and self-reliance.
Potential Fifth-Generation Fighter Options
Given the advancements of India’s rivals in fifth-generation fighter technology, procuring such aircraft may be necessary to bridge the capability gap until the indigenous AMCA program reaches maturity. Here are the potential options:
- United States:
- The F-22 Raptor is not available for export, and its production has been discontinued.
- The F-35 Lightning II might be offered to India, but it could come with stringent conditions that might conflict with India’s strategic autonomy, particularly given India’s acquisition of Russian S-400 air defense systems.
- China:
- China’s fifth-generation fighters include the Chengdu J-20 and Shenyang FC-31. However, India and China are strategic rivals and do not procure military applications from each other due to mutual geopolitical and strategic mistrust.
- Russia:
- The Su-57 Felon is a viable option for India, with the potential for fewer restrictions compared to U.S. offerings. It is likely to be more cost-effective and aligns with India’s longstanding defense partnership with Russia.
- India could negotiate for localized production of the Su-57, potentially enabling Russia to export the aircraft through an Indian assembly line despite sanctions. This arrangement would also bolster India’s defense manufacturing capabilities.
A Critical Need for Fifth-Generation Fighters
While India’s indigenous fighter programs are progressing, its strategic rivals are advancing rapidly in the domain of air superiority. China, a significant rival, already has operational fifth-generation fighter aircraft and has unveiled its sixth-generation aircraft, signaling a formidable technological edge. Additionally, Pakistan, India’s arch-rival, recently announced plans to procure fifth-generation fighters from China.
Given this scenario, India may need to consider procuring a small number of fifth-generation fighters as a stopgap measure, similar to how the Rafale provided a temporary solution during the IAF’s critical capability gap. With the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) program projected to reach the prototype stage around 2029-2030, induction by 2034, and mass production by 2035, the timeline for indigenous fifth-generation capabilities remains distant.
Meanwhile, the Tejas Mk1/Mk1A will continue to bolster the IAF’s fleet by replacing the aging MiG-21s, with production ramping up significantly by 2030. The Tejas Mk2, entering production in 2030, will help retire older Jaguar, Mirage, and MiG-29 aircraft. However, the depletion of IAF strength and the advancements in air superiority by neighboring countries underscore the need for India to address this critical gap.
By acquiring fifth-generation fighters from another country, India could ensure technological parity and maintain air dominance while its indigenous programs mature. However, this decision would need to balance immediate operational needs with long-term goals of self-reliance and cost-effectiveness.
Conclusion
While the MRFA program’s initial ambitions of a large-scale acquisition with extensive domestic production did not materialize, the procurement of 36 Rafales marked a significant step in modernizing the IAF. However, with the Tejas Mk2 nearing production and capable of rivaling the Rafale’s specifications, India faces a strategic decision. Investing in the indigenous platform could offer long-term benefits, including cost efficiency, technological sovereignty, and operational adaptability, aligning with India’s vision for self-reliance in defense manufacturing.
Simultaneously, the rapidly evolving strategic landscape may necessitate interim solutions, such as acquiring a limited number of fifth-generation fighters, to maintain parity with regional adversaries. This dual approach could enable India to address immediate challenges while staying on course to achieve its long-term defense objectives.